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Indra Øverland
Defusing a Ticking Bomb?
Disentangling International Organisations
in Samtskhe-Javakheti
[Abstract] This article examines how various organisations divide and coordinate
their conflict prevention and development aid in the Samtskhe-Javakheti region of
southern Georgia, and how that coordination might be improved. There have been
numerous early warnings of impending violent conflict and calls for conflict prevention
in Samtskhe-Javakheti. Counter-claims have, however, been asserted that the
region’s problem is in fact not one of potential violent ethnic conflict, but rather one
of poverty and peripherality, and that exaggerated, uncoordinated early warning
might in fact inflate conflicts that were not initially acute. At one point it seemed
that the Samtskhe-Javakheti case would provide an example of uncoordinated and
one-sided focus on conflict prevention and early warning on the part of international
organisations, and its potentially detrimental consequences. An overview of the
activities of the organisations, however, shows the contrary. A critical, sensitive and
deconstructive perspective is already incorporated into their approach, and their
activities are well coordinated. More formalised institutions are nonetheless needed
to ensure the inclusion of large multilateral actors such as the World Bank and
Council of Europe in the process, and consistent coordination in other regions too.
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Introduction 
Numerous authors have argued for the interconnectedness of underdevelop-
ment and conflict, and consequently for the linkage of development aid and 
conflict prevention.1 The conflict-development theme became a particularly 
important focus of attention during the 1990s with the establishment of the 
Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict and an OECD task 
force to examine the linkages between conflict, peace and development aid.2 
In 1999 the Carnegie Commission estimated that if effective preventive mea-
sures had been taken in nine countries affected by conflict in the 1990s, the 
OECD countries alone could have saved more than USD 160 billion.3 
Occasionally statements about the connection between development and 
conflict prevention seem to indicate that they are two good things that aid 
agencies wish upon their recipients and therefore superficially lump together 
in a chicken-and-egg relationship without further clarification. In other cases 
there are more complex arguments detailing the relationship between them. 
It is argued variously that development aid can facilitate the resolution of 
violent conflicts, that conflict resolution facilitates socio-economic develop-
ment, or both.4 Leonhardt and Nyheim argue among other things that con-
flict hinders development.5 While recognising that poverty and conflict often 
are associated, Azar, Stokke and others have argued that socio-economic 
development can potentially worsen rather than solve ethnic conflicts, 
especially when it results in increased regional disparities.6 Other authors 
have maintained that relative deprivation in itself is not enough, and that the 
perception of relative deprivation and faith in the ability to resolve it through 
violence are also necessary for the poverty–conflict equation to work.7  
                                                     
1  Stokke, O., ‘Violent Conflict Prevention and Development Co-operation: Coherent or 
Conflicting Perspectives’, Forum for Development Studies, no. 2, 1997, p. 196. 
2  OECD, DAC Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation, (Paris: 
OECD, 1997), p. 7. 
3  OECD, Helping Prevent Violent Conflict: Orientations for External Partners, (Paris: 
OECD, 2001), p.11. 
4  Lodgaard, S. and Rønnfeldt, C., Development Assistance as a means of Conflict Preven-
tion, (Oslo: NUPI , 1998), p. 2; Sæther, G., ‘Inequality, Security and Violence’, The Euro-
pean Journal of Development Research, vol. 13, no. 1, 2001, p. 195. 
5  Leonhardt, M. and Nyheim, D., Promoting Development in Areas of Actual or Potential 
Violent Conflict: Approaches in Conflict Impact Assessment and Early Warning, 
(London: FEWER and International Alert, 1999), p. 1. 
6  Azar, E., The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Cases, (Hampshire, 
England: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1990), cited in Peck, C., ‘Finding Structural 
Solutions to Conflict’ in Peck, C., (ed.), Sustainable Peace: The role of the UN and 
Regional Organizations in Preventing Conflict, (New York: Carnegie Commission on 
Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1998), pp. 58–59. See also Miall, H., Ramsbotham, O., and 
Woodhouse, T., (eds.), Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management 
and Transformation of Deadly Conflict, (London: Polity Press, 1999), pp. 73, 86, 92, 108; 
Stokke, O., op. cit., p. 217; The Carnegie Commission on the Prevention of Deadly Con-
flict, Preventing Deadly Conflict: Final Report, (New York: Carnegie Commission, 
1997), p. 84. 
7  Gurr, T., Why Men Rebel, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), cited in Stokke, 
O., ‘Violent Conflict Prevention and Development Co-operation: Coherent or Conflicting 
Perspectives’, in Forum for Development Studies, no. 2, 1997, p. 224. 
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In sum, the precise causal relationships between conflict, development, 
peace and underdevelopment remain multifaceted, indeterminate and un-
clear.8 What is clear is that a conscious, integrated and coordinated approach 
to conflict and development is needed in order to compensate for that com-
plexity.9 The OECD Development Assistance Committee has summed up 
that there is a need for 
 
greater coherence and transparency in conflict prevention initiatives and 
responses to conflict and complex emergencies by the international commun-
ity. This involves early warning that is more closely linked to decision-mak-
ing and better organised and co-ordinated among the various multilateral, 
regional, bilateral and non-governmental actors. Wherever possible, a shared 
analysis should lead to agreed strategic frameworks for action and to agreed 
responsibilities for leadership in co-ordination, taking into account the local, 
national, regional and international context.10 
 
Recognising both the importance of conflict–development linkages, the lack 
of clarity about their exact nature and the calls for coordination to compen-
sate for those limitations, this article aims to answer the following questions: 
(1) How do various organisations divide and coordinate their conflict pre-
vention and development aid in the Samtskhe-Javakheti region of southern 
Georgia? (2) How might their current approach be improved? 
The Samtskhe-Javakheti region provides a particularly interesting case 
for such a study because it has a whole range of entangled problems and 
potential problems relating to both underdevelopment, peripherality, military 
issues and several potential ethnic conflicts. In addition, during the period 
from 1995 to 2001 international organisations have taken an increasing inter-
est in the region, variously implementing development aid or conflict pre-
vention projects.11 
Samtskhe-Javakheti is one of Georgia’s twelve provinces (mkhare). The 
Javakheti part of the region borders on Armenia and is predominantly 
Armenian. The other part of the region, Samtskhe, borders on Turkey and 
has a more even mix of Armenians and Georgians with other smaller groups 
thrown in. There are three main cities in the region of relevance to this study. 
Akhalkalaki and Ninotsminda in Javakheti are important Armenian strong-
holds, while Akhaltsikhe lies in Samtskhe, has a stronger Georgian 
component and functions as the capital of the entire Samtskhe-Javakheti 
region. 
                                                     
8  Stokke, O., op. cit., p. 202. 
9  OECD, DAC Guidelines, op. cit., p. 13, Stokke, O., op. cit., p. 228; Leonhardt, M. The 
Challenge of Linking Aid and Peacebuilding, (London: International Alert, 2000), p. 5. 
10  DAC, Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation, op. cit., p. 4; cf. Rusu, S., ‘Prin-
ciples and Practice of Conflict Early Warning’, in Journal of Conflict, Security and Deve-
lopment, vol. 1, no. 2, 2001, p. 127. 
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11  CIPDD and FEWER, Policy Brief: Javakheti in Georgia. Problems, Challenges and 
Necessary Responses, (Tbilisi: CIPDD, 2000), p. 1. Available from www.fewer.org 
/pubs/index.htm. 
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Figure 1. Main map: Georgia and adjacent countries. Inset map: Samtskhe-Javakheti. 
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Samtskhe-Javakheti: problems and 
potential problems 
Socio-economic underdevelopment 
The Samtskhe-Javakheti region has a whole rainbow of present and potential 
problems. Most strikingly, it is one of the poorest parts of Georgia. Contri-
buting to the dire socio-economic situation are the harsh climate and land-
scape, in particular in Javakheti.12 Most of Javakheti is consists of high 
mountains, and some of its towns and villages are over 2,000 metres above 
sea level. With the exception of a few narrow valleys the landscape is arid 
and treeless with dusty cold winds during the winter and difficult agricultural 
conditions.  
The socio-economic development of the region is also hindered by lack-
ing infrastructure and the dire state of what infrastructure there is, in particu-
lar roads, housing and medical facilities. Neglect on the part of the central 
authorities in Tbilisi and the lack of effective means of communication have 
isolated the region from the rest of Georgia.  
An important factor contributing to the region’s isolation and lack of 
development is its former status as a closed border zone. Constituting part of 
one of the two only direct borders between the Soviet Union and a NATO 
country, a 78 km wide swathe of land along the border was subject to strict 
limitations on travel and was not prioritised in terms of socio-economic 
development.13 
The majority of Javakheti’s male population engages in seasonal labour 
migration to Russia, providing one of the region’s main sources of income. It 
also renders Javakheti sensitive to downturns in the Russian economy, such 
as in August 1998, and dependent on Russian–Georgian visa regimes, which 
have been tightened since 1998. 
Tension between ethnic Armenian population and Georgian 
authorities 
Between 92 and 97 per cent of Javakheti’s population is ethnic Armenian.14 
They feel neglected by the Georgian authorities in terms of socio-economic 
development and investments in infrastructure, and threatened by Georgian 
nation-building. The Javakheti Armenians in turn are sometimes perceived 
by the Georgian authorities as potential separatists and a threat to Georgia’s 
territorial integrity. On several occasions during the 1990s, officials 
appointed by Tbilisi were rebuffed by the Javakheti Armenians. There were 
                                                     
12  Ginosyan, O., ‘A View on the Political and Economic Situation in Javakheti’, in 
Hovhannisyan, N. and Gogsadze, G., Ethnoregional Policy of Armenia and Georgia, 
(Yerevan: Institute of Oriental Studies, 1999), p. 34, 36. 
13 The other direct border between the Soviet Union and a NATO country was that between 
the Kola Peninsula in north-western Russia and Finnmark County in northern Norway. 
14  Cf. Rochowanski, A., Assessment of the Current Situation in Javakheti for UNDP 
Georgia June–July 2001, (Tbilisi: UNDP, 2001), p. 2; CIPDD and FEWER, op. cit., p. 1. 
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also incidents when Georgian military activity in Javakheti was thwarted by 
the Armenians, and in 1990 and 1991 a border post between Javakheti and 
Armenia was blown up.15 It has been said that at the end of the Soviet period 
there was a debate among the Armenians as to which area they should aim 
for first, the small one or the big one. They went for the big one, Nagorno-
Karabakh, while the small one, Javakheti, was left alone for the time being.16 
Such talk makes the already jittery Georgian authorities even more nervous. 
Akhalkalaki military base 
Relations between the Georgian authorities and the ethnic Armenian minor-
ity are exacerbated by another important aspect of the region’s Cold War 
legacy: a 2–3000 man strong military base at Akhalkalaki, one of several 
bases that Russia maintains in Georgia and that Georgia has been trying to 
rid itself of since it gained independence.17 The base has a long history, dat-
ing from the Russo-Turkish wars around 1830. It was established as a Rus-
sian and Christian outpost against the Turks and to some extent is still seen 
that way by local ethnic Armenians. While the Georgian authorities see the 
base as undermining Georgian sovereignty, the ethnic Armenian population 
in Javakheti sees it as a security guarantee in uneasy relations with the 
Georgian authorities. The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) has led negotiations between Georgia and Russia about the 
timeframe and conditions for the closure of the base, but conclusive agree-
ments have so far not been reached. For Georgia the continued Russian mili-
tary presence is also an obstacle to closer integration with NATO. 
The base is also a cornerstone of Javakheti’s economy, providing both 
employment for locals and a market for local agricultural produce and ser-
vices. The economic importance of the base is so great that in Javakheti the 
Russian rouble is more widespread than the Georgian lari.18 
                                                     
15  Melikishvili, L., Latent Conflict in Polyethnic Society (Tbilisi: Tbilisi University Press, 
1999), pp. 96. 
16  Cf. Hovhannisyan, N., ‘On Some Peculiarities of Ethnoregional Policy of Armenia’, in 
Hovhannisyan, N. and Gogsadze, G., op. cit., p. 55; Dzhincharadze, P., ‘Should Russian 
Military Bases Be Withdrawn from Georgia: Several Aspects of the Situation’, in Central 
Asia and the Caucasus Journal of Social and Political Studies, no. 5, 2000, p. 127; Nodia, 
G., ‘A New Cycle of Instability in Georgia: New Troubles and Old Problems’, in Bertsch, 
G., Craft, C., Jones, S., and Beck, M., (eds.), Crossroads and Conflict: Security and For-
eign Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia, (London: Routledge, 2000), p.194. 
17  Darchiashvili, D., ‘Ethnic Relations as Security Factor in Southern Georgia’, in Central 
Asia and Caucasus Journal of Social and Political Studies, no. 1, 2000, p. 53. At the 
Istanbul OSCE Summit Russia agreed to shut down its bases in Vaziani outside Tbilisi 
and in Gudauta in Abkhazia. The bases in Batumi in Adjaria and in Akhalkalaki still 
remain to be agreed upon. Georgia argues for a three-year withdrawal plan, while Russia 
maintains that it needs 15 years. Tseretelli, V., ‘Russia and Georgia: Post-Soviet Divorce’, 
in Central Asia and the Caucasus Journal of Social and Political Studies, no. 3, 2001, p. 
117. 
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18  CIPDD and FEWER, op. cit., p. 2. Upon driving into Akhalkalki the first time my 
Georgian driver and I stopped at a petrol station on the outskirts of the town. We were 
baffled by the ridiculously high petrol prices noted on a large board outside the station. As 
we pulled up at one of the pumps, a young man approached the car. The driver asked him 
politely in Georgian about the prices. The young man looked blankly back at us. The 
driver repeated what he had said a couple of times, trying to explain. In the end the young 
man sternly said “Chto?” [what] in Russian, indicating that he could not understand or did 
not want to be spoken to in Georgian. We now asked him in Russian, and it turned out 
that the prices were in Russian roubles. 
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Due to the war in Nagorno-Karabakh and its geo-political isolation, 
Armenia has become greatly dependent upon Russia, and the interests of the 
two countries are seen as overlapping in many areas. Around 70 per cent of 
the personnel at the Russian base are actually Armenians with Russian pass-
ports.19 The base is particularly threatening for the Georgian authorities in 
light of the fact that some Armenians from Javakheti contributed in the war 
over Nagorno-Karabakh, and that the base has been used to distribute wea-
pons to local Armenians in times of insecurity.20 
Repatriation of the Meskhetian Turks 
As a part of its accession package to the CoE, Georgia had to accept the 
repatriation of the Meskhetian Turks within a time frame of twelve years.21 
The Meskhetian Turks are Muslims of unclear ethnic identity who were 
deported from southern Georgia to Central Asia by Stalin’s regime in 
1944.22 In 1989 they were thrown out of their homes in the Ferghana Valley 
in Central Asia during pogroms. Many had a long-term dream of returning to 
Georgia, and aimed to repatriate.23 However, they were unwelcome in 
Georgia, and as a result they were spread throughout Turkey and various for-
mer Soviet states where the local population is often hostile towards them. 
The total number of Meskhetian Turks, and how many of them actually wish 
to go to Georgia, is uncertain. There are probably between 200,000 and 
400,000 of them in total, mostly residing in Russia, Azerbaijan, Turkey, 
8Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine.24 
Both Armenians and Georgians are sceptical to their repatriation, often 
citing family stories of abuse by Muslims or Turks and lack of housing and 
arable land. Armenians tend to have a particularly negative attitude, which is 
related to Armenia’s bad relationship with Azerbaijan and Turkey, and the 
dispute about Turkish massacres of Armenians during the early 20th century. 
Part of the Armenian population in Javakheti in fact descends from 
Armenian refugees from Anatolia who settled there during the 19th cen-
tury.25 
Armenians have occasionally implied that the Georgian authorities might 
use the repatriation of the Meskhetian Turks to counterbalance the Armenian 
population in Samtskhe-Javakheti. The resettlement of Georgian-speaking 
Muslims in Ninotsminda due to erosion and landslides in Adjaria during the 
1980s has fuelled this Armenian conspiracy theory.26 Meanwhile some 
                                                     
19  CIPDD and FEWER, op. cit., p. 4. 
20  Melikishvili, L., op. cit., pp. 97. 
21  Rusetski, A., ‘Factors of Sustainable Development of a Polyethnic State Exemplified by 
Georgia’, in Hovhannisyan, N. and Gogsadze, G., op. cit., p. 89; Kokoev, K., and 
Svanidze, G., ‘Problems of National (Ethnic) Minorities in Georgia’, in Central Asia and 
Caucasus Journal of Social and Political Studies, no. 1, 2000, p. 37, 38, 42. 
22  Ségolène, A., ‘La Diaspora Meskhète Face aux Défis de la Transition Post-Sovetique’, in 
Cahiers d’études su la Méditerranée orientale et le monde turco-iranien, no. 30, 2000, p. 
114. 
23  Ségolène, A., ibid., p. 121, 123. 
24  Ségolène, A., ibid., p. 114. 
25  Darchiashvili, D., op. cit., p. 44. 
26  Several hundred Adjarian families were resettled to Ninotsminda. Now less than a hund-
red remain. CIPDD and FEWER, op. cit., p. 1. Available from www.fewer.org/pubs/ 
index.htm; Melikishvili, L., op. cit., p. 66; Rusetski, A., ‘Factors of Sustainable Develop-
ment of a Polyethnic State Exemplified by Georgia’, in Hovhannisyan, N. and Gogsadze, 
G., op. cit., p. 89. 
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Georgians fear that the resettlement of the Meskhetian Turks on the border 
to Turkey might pose yet another separatist threat. 
The Dukhobors under pressure 
Finally the small Russian religious sect of Dukhobors feels that its land is 
being encroached upon and that it is being forced out of the region by com-
peting Armenians and Georgians.27 The Dukhobors were moved from 
Tavriysk and Voronezh in Russia to Javakheti in the 1830s and 1840s, and 
now many have opted to go back to Russia.28 Around 800 remain of the 
more than 3,000 who were registered in 1989.29 
Linkages between problems and with the national and 
regional contexts 
Samtskhe-Javakheti’s problems are all intimately interwoven. Poverty and 
underdevelopment render the Armenians dependent upon the Akhalkalaki 
military base. Their support for the base makes the Georgian authorities 
suspicious of them. The failure of the Georgian authorities to enhance the 
development of Samtskhe-Javakheti and the submission of Javakheti to a 
regional capital in Akhaltsikhe render the Armenians suspicious of the 
Georgian authorities. Georgia’s promise to the CoE to repatriate the 
Meskhetian Turks strengthens the wish of the Armenians to retain the base. 
The Georgian national context has further ramifications for the problems 
in Samtskhe-Javakheti. During the early period of independence the 
Georgian elite in Tbilisi engaged in a nation-building process that was often 
characterised by Georgian ethnocentrism. This in turn made the numerous 
and large minorities that occupy much of the country’s mountainous rim 
weary of Georgian integrationist attempts, and encouraged separatist tenden-
cies among them. There were wars in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in north-
western Georgia during the first half of the 1990s. In particular Abkhazia 
remains de facto independent of Tbilisi. The sizeable Armenian minority in 
Abkhazia in fact supported the Abkhaz bid for independence, providing 
Georgians with a further basis for linking experiences in Abkhazia with the 
perception of a separatist threat in Javakheti.30 Adjaria on Georgia’s south-
eastern border with Turkey is populated by Georgian-speaking Muslims and 
the Pankisi Gorge in the eastern part of Georgia is populated by Kists, a 
Chechen group. Neither area has experienced war, but both have almost as 
much de facto independence from Tbilisi as do Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
These events and situations have filled relations between the Georgian 
majority and the country’s many minorities with volatility and mutual suspi-
cion, including relations between Tbilisi and the Javakheti Armenians. 
The wider regional context of the Caucasus has yet further implications 
for Samtskhe-Javakheti. Relations between Russia and Georgia are strained 
by Russian underhand support for the separatist struggles in Abkhazia and 
                                                     
27  Melikishvili, L., op. cit., pp. 44, 68, 94, 103–104. 
28  Dzhincharadze, P., ‘Should Russian Military Bases Be Withdrawn from Georgia: Several 
Aspects of the Situation’, in Central Asia and the Caucasus Journal of Social and 
Political Studies, no. 5, 2000, p. 128. 
29  CIPDD and FEWER, op. cit., p. 1. Available from www.fewer.org/pubs/index.htm. 
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30  Cf. Hovhannisyan, N. in Hovhannisyan, N. and Gogsadze, G., op. cit., p. 60. 
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South Ossetia, and by Russian accusations of Georgian failure to deal with 
Chechen rebels operating out of the Pankisi Gorge. Some Georgians per-
ceive the repatriation of the Meskhetian Turks as a Russian ploy to destabil-
ise the region and retain the Akhalkalaki military base. Armenia has been at 
war with Azerbaijan, is subject to a Turkish blockade and is nervous about 
Turkish expansionism in the region. Samtskhe-Javakheti is a likely trajectory 
for future possible oil and gas pipelines transiting Georgia on the way from 
Azerbaijan to Turkey. Western countries, organisations and companies 
favour Georgia as a pipeline route because it diminishes dependency on Rus-
sian export routes and thus Russian hegemony in the region. Russia sees 
Georgian pipeline routes as a threat to its interests in the Caucasus. 
The mix of problems in Samtskhe-Javakheti bears a striking resemblance 
to the preconditions for violent conflict and the ties to underdevelopment 
identified in theory: 
 
Factors which may contribute to the polarisation of ethnic and cultural differ-
ences include: economic, social and political dislocation resulting from 
imbalanced development itself; the legacy of colonial boundaries; illegitimate 
or weak state institutions; the forced assimilation of minorities; and aspira-
tions for increased autonomy by territorially concentrated ethnic groups.31 
 
And certainly there has been no lack of warnings about the potential for 
large-scale ethnic conflict in Samtskhe-Javakheti.32 
                                                     
31  OECD, DAC Guidelines, op. cit., p. 12. 
32  E.g. Aivazyan, H., ‘Some Peculiarities of Ethnoregional Policy of Georgia Exemplified 
by Javakheti’, in Hovhannisyan, N. and Gogsadze, G., op. cit., p. 14; Melikishvili, L., op. 
cit., pp. 86, 101, 109. 
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The international response 
Early warning 
International organisations have produced numerous reports warning about 
Samtskhe-Javakheti’s problems and the danger of violent conflict. In March 
1999 the Centre for Civil–Military Relations in Tbilisi produced a report in 
cooperation with the NGO Conciliation Resources on the security situation 
in the region for the UNHCR’s (United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees) ‘Local Monitoring Project in the CIS’.33 In July 2000 the London-
based Forum on Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER) in coopera-
tion with the Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development 
(CIPDD) produced a policy brief mapping the problems in Javakheti and 
proposing countermeasures.34 During the same period the UN Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) started producing regular 
briefing notes on the situation and international activities in the region. In 
July 2001 the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) had the 
situation in Samtskhe-Javakheti assessed and yet another report was pro-
duced.35 
In 2000 the OSCE set up a large-scale early warning project on 
Samtskhe-Javakheti, with 12 local correspondents submitting monthly 
reports to CIPDD. CIPDD processes the information from the correspon-
dents and passes it on to the OSCE, which further disseminates it, including 
to the government of Georgia. The contents of the reports are purposely kept 
confident. The OSCE was also involved in the ‘Media Project on the Preven-
tion of Ethnic Conflict in Georgia’ run by the media NGO Studiore, which 
included a series of televised roundtable discussions in which problems in 
and related to Samtskhe-Javakheti were debated openly by representatives of 
various groups and institutions. 
Untimely warning? 
Before managing to visit Samtskhe-Javakheti, I sat in the basement office of 
a Tbilisi NGO one afternoon and interviewed the members of the NGO 
about the problems in Samtskhe-Javakheti. One of the interviewees was par-
ticularly critical of my approach to the region. She said ‘I want to do early 
warning work with you now, and tell you to be careful about words that you 
use. Every conflict and every place is different’. She went on to criticise the 
way international organisations and researchers talk and write about the 
danger of conflicts in the region, arguing that they might in fact foment con-
flicts that were not initially serious or even existent. She argued that verbali-
sation can exacerbate low-intensity conflicts. 
                                                     
33  Darchiasvhili, D., Southern Georgia: Security Objectives and Challenges, (Tbilisi: 
CCMR, 1999).  
34  CIPDD and FEWER, op. cit.  
35  Rochowanski, A., op. cit.. 
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Later it struck me that the frequent refusal of local officials both in 
Samtskhe-Javakheti and elsewhere in the former Soviet Union to acknow-
ledge ethnic conflict or talk about ‘nationalism’, might in fact be a conflict 
prevention measure in line with her way of thinking. There is often particular 
reluctance to use the word ‘conflict’, even in conjunction with ‘preven-
tion’.36 The offhand dismissal by foreign researchers and organisations of 
this reluctance as a residue of Soviet propaganda and intransparency might 
in fact be rather misplaced and unconstructive. 
Early warning can feed into worsening mutual media representations of 
ethnic groups, a crucial aspect of contemporary ethnic conflict. During 2000 
and 2001 the problems in Samtskhe-Javakheti were increasingly relayed by 
both Georgian, Armenian and international media.37 Events which may not 
initially be related to ethnic identity can easily be misconstrued by anticipa-
tory media in an atmosphere of early warning.38 
For example, after visiting Samtskhe-Javakheti in September 2001 I 
could not return to Tbilisi via the town Tsalka, as I had intended. The Tbilisi 
media had reported ethnic violence in Tsalka during the past few days, inter-
nal troops had been sent in and the situation was not considered safe. It later 
turned out to be a quarrel between two neighbours: one neighbour had killed 
the other’s dog; the other neighbour had retributed by killing the first neigh-
bour’s dog. Fighting had ensued in which two people were allegedly killed. 
One of the neighbours happened to be Armenian and the other Georgian, and 
the Tbilisi media picked up on this. Locals in Ninotsminda and Akhalkalaki, 
however, entirely refused to give the ethnic aspect of the incident any 
weight, seeing it as a ridiculous neighbourly squabble without ethnic ramifi-
cations. The danger, as I was warned by my NGO interviewee in Tbilisi, is 
that things may become what they are called. 
When skewed media imagery is fed back into the local environment it 
can have adverse consequences. For example, a member of an Armenian 
NGO in Samtskhe-Javakheti told me he had been asked in an interview by a 
journalist whether he thought that the Georgian government wanted to settle 
the Meskhetian Turks in the area in order to neutralise the Armenian popula-
tion. He had never thought or heard of anything like that before. Another 
Armenian felt that an article written by a foreign journalist gave the 
                                                     
36  CIPDD and FEWER, op. cit., p. 5. 
37  For example, the Institute for War and Peace Reporting reported on the region on 22 
September 2001 (Alaverdyan, D., ‘Armenia Faces Georgian Dilemma’, IWPR’s Caucasus 
Reporting Service, no. 102), and the English-language Armenian internet news service 
Asbarez Online reported on Samtskhe-Javakheti and related issues at least 13 times during 
the first ten months of 2001 (‘ARS Creates Fund to Aid Armenians of Javakhk’, 9 
February 2001; ‘The Issue of Javakhk Involves the Right to Self-Determination Says 
Roustamian’, 8 February 2001; ‘ARS “Javakhk Fund” Needs your Assistance’, 27 
February 2001; ‘Shevardnadse Concerned Over Recent Articles Printed on Javakhk’, 2 
March 2001; ‘ARF Statement on Javakhk’, 5 March 2001; ‘Armenia to Reconstruct 
Alternative Road to Georgia’, 20 March 2001; ‘Georgians Believe Javakhk’s Problems 
are Only Socio-Economic’, 4 June 2001; ‘Georgian Political Analyst Says Repatriation of 
Meskhetian Turks Dangerous’, 10 July 2001; ‘Javakhk Armenians Appeal to 
Shevardnadse’, 7 August 2001; ‘Journalist Comments on Situation in Javakhk’, 8 August 
2001; ‘Base Withdrawal in Akhalkalak will Affect Local Population’, 4 September 2001; 
‘PACE Discusses Rights of Javakhk Armenians’, 25 September 2001; ‘Georgia 
Denounces Rustamian’s Statements’, 26 September 2001. These articles can be found at 
www.asbarez.com. 
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impression that ‘several thousand men, armed to the teeth, control the towns 
of Akhalkalaki and Ninotsminda’, that they are ‘a delayed-action bomb’.39 
I also had other experiences in Samtskhe-Javakheti that indicated that the 
degree of ethnic animosity on the ground was far from proportional to the 
amount of early warning about the region. Having heard and read numerous 
times about how the Armenians hated Turks and would never allow the 
Meskhetian Turks to return, it was surprising to find about eight Meskhetian 
Turk families already having repatriated and living peacefully in 
Akhaltsikhe. While interviewing one of those families a girl came in and 
offered us coffee. I thought she might be a daughter or cousin of the family I 
was interviewing. It turned out, however, that she was their Armenian neigh-
bour, with whom they were obviously on friendly terms. The explanation of 
this paradoxical situation may lie precisely in the exaggerated image of local 
ethnic conflicts created by outsiders, including the national media looking 
for scandal, the Georgian and Armenian elites engaged in nation-building 
and international organisations doing early warning and trying to prevent 
violent conflict. 
In a critique of mixing aid with politics, Sæther argues that it is easy for 
external actors to underestimate the 
 
complexity of political activity. Questions of political power relations 
between centres(s) and regions are always at the core of politics. How may 
foreign actors take on such a role and responsibility for which they will not 
be held accountable?… Can, and will, such interventions create political sta-
bility, or will they only add fuel to an already heated political situation? How 
can foreign actors be seen as promoting democracy when they design a 
framework for politics at a moment when national politics is in ruins?40 
 
Going to Samtskhe-Javakheti also confirmed that the region suffers from 
peripherality and severe underdevelopment: the first thing that strikes one is 
the bad state of the few roads connecting the towns and cities of the region. 
Most are potholed to an extent that defies any driver or vehicle.41 Houses are 
derelict and schools and medical facilities lack basic equipment. While most 
organisations note the socio-economic troubles of the region in their reports, 
few provide statistics or go into any detail. As one Armenian has written, 
‘we have tried to draw in representatives of various countries, banks, funds, 
investors and donors. They all inquired about our problems closely, listened 
to our answers very-very attentively, showed their deep compassion and – 
left! Done with it’.42 The disproportionate focus of aid workers on ethnic 
conflict is precisely what Mary Anderson warned against in her celebrated 
book Do No Harm.43 
If Samtskhe-Javakheti’s main problems are in fact underdevelopment and 
isolation, then perhaps international organisations should channel their 
                                                     
39  Article by Lieu, C., in the Azeri Times, 19 March 1999, cited in Ginosyan, O., ‘A View on 
the Political and Economic Situation in Javakheti’, in Hovhannisyan, N. and Gogsadze, 
G., op. cit., p. 38. 
40  Sæther, G., op. cit., pp. 208–209. 
41  The short road between Akhalkalaki and Ninotsminda is an exception, since it was 
repaired for a visit from Shevardnadse. 
42  Ginosyan, O., ‘A View on the Political and Economic Situation in Javakheti’, in 
Hovhannisyan, N. and Gogsadze, G., op. cit., p. 37. 
43  Anderson, Mary B., Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace – or War, (London: 
Lynne Rienner, 1999), pp. 23, 37. 
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resources directly into solving those problems and talk and write less about 
looming conflict. To the degree that there is also a danger of violent conflict 
due to the socio-economic problems, development aid may in fact also be the 
most efficacious means of conflict prevention, going to the root of the pro-
blems rather than dealing with their symptoms and even risking aggravating 
them. It is clear that the region has great needs for improved medical facili-
ties; schools, kindergartens and children’s homes; infrastructure such as 
roads, electricity, water supply and sewage; and not least local governance 
and administrative relations with the central Georgian authorities. 
It would be tempting to apply the Copenhagen School’s securitisation 
perspective to the approach of various organisations to Samtskhe-
Javakheti.44 Securitisation is the notion that issues become security issues 
through the discourse of actors with specific interests. It would seem that it 
is in the self-interest of numerous organisations to maximise the probability 
of crisis in order to draw attention to themselves and justify their activities in 
Samtskhe-Javakheti. 
Sitting in the NGO’s basement office in Tbilisi being warned about early 
warning, I thought I had found the perfect turn for an article on Samtskhe-
Javakheti: ‘International organisations and overzealous early warning risk 
blowing up poor region rather than defusing its problems. Greater conscious-
ness about the relationship between underdevelopment and more coordina-
tion are needed.’ 
All is, however, not so simple. A more thorough examination of the early 
warning documents on Samtskhe-Javakheti and the projects that have been 
implemented there reveals great complexity – not only in the politics of the 
region, but also in the approach of the various organisations engaged there. 
A sensitive, coordinated approach 
In their joint early warning report, CIPDD and FEWER state that  
 
The issue of whether and why Javakheti should be singled out as a problem 
area and as a special target for assistance programs, is a sensitive and some-
times controversial problem in itself… Extreme caution and sensitivity 
should be employed by all governmental, non-governmental, local and inter-
national actors, so that any assistance programs do not raise false expectati-
ons and threaten the delicate regional balance.45 
 
Similarly, writing about Samtskhe-Javakheti for a UNHCR project, 
Darchiashvili notes that ‘it can be dangerous to impose a conflictual dynamic 
on complex circumstances which do not inevitably have to lead to con-
flict’.46 Thus international organisations have mostly been aware of the 
unclear relationship between poverty and conflict and the sensitivity of con-
flict prevention in Samtskhe-Javakheti, and make the same point I am mak-
ing in their own reports and discourse. 
                                                     
44 Cf. Buzan, B., Wæver, O., and de Wilde, Jaap, Security: a New Framework for Analysis, 
(London: Lynne Rienner, 1998), pp. 23–24. 
45 CIPDD and FEWER, op. cit., pp. 1–2. 
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A closer look at projects implemented in the region also shows that there 
was a good mix of projects related to conflict prevention and development 
aid. A useful overview of various types of projects in Samtskhe-Javakheti up 
to 2000 is provided in the Javakheti Stability Consolidation Plan published 
jointly by the NGOs CIPDD, FEWER and EWI (East West Institute).47 In 
addition to the early warning reports of different organisations mentioned 
above, in 1998 the OSCE arranged seminars on human rights in the 
Ninotsminda and Akhalkalaki areas; and in 1999 and 2000 the UNV funded 
the publication of the Multinational Georgia Newsletter by the NGO Multi-
national Georgia to encourage the information flow between various ethnic 
groups. 
Nonetheless, projects related to conflict prevention have not predomi-
nated unduly. In fact there have been roughly the same number of projects 
related to socio-economic development. For example, in 1997 Oxfam and 
the Dutch Embassy funded a project implemented by the NGO Centrum 
voor Begaafdheidsondersoek (CBO) which involved the restoration of the 
Ninotsminda Culture Centre and also entailed income generation for several 
families; in 1998 the Eurasia Foundation funded a trip for a delegation from 
Ninotsminda to various businesses and resource centres in Georgia and 
Armenia; in 1999 the UNV distributed 400 food packages to elderly and dis-
abled people in the Akhalkalaki and Ninotsminda districts.  
The Javakheti Stability Consolidation Plan distinguishes between pro-
jects according to ten seemingly haphazard prefixed categories. These cate-
gories do not entirely serve the purpose of distinguishing between develop-
ment aid and conflict prevention, so I have introduced the extra category of 
early warning and regrouped them all into two main blocs. The first bloc 
consists of those projects directly or indirectly related to development aid, 
while the second bloc consists of those related to conflict prevention. The 
pure coordination projects have not been included in this overview, since 
they are related neither to development aid nor to conflict prevention. 
                                                     
47 CIPDD and FEWER, op. cit., pp. 12–16. 
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Figure 2. Number of development aid and conflict prevention projects compared. 
 Conclusions 
The Samtskhe-Javakheti case shows that it is necessary to mirror the com-
plexity of development and conflict inter-linkages in the work of internatio-
nal organisations. It shows that it is crucial that they have a reflected, 
sensitive and coordinated approach. Different organisations have different 
comparative competences and advantages in relation to conflict prevention 
and development aid. The sensitivity of conflict prevention in a post-Soviet 
location with particular developmental difficulties also makes it important 
that the international organisations know what the others are calling things 
and what they are doing about them. 
The case of Samtskhe-Javakheti also shows that such an approach is pos-
sible. The coordination of international organisations in the region, their 
division of labour and the integration of conflict prevention and development 
have all been good and reflexive. Several factors have facilitated this fortuit-
ous evolution of affairs. The initiatives and high quality work emanating 
from organisations such as FEWER, EWI and CIPDD have been crucial. 
The simultaneous entry of many organisations to Georgia and the former 
Soviet space over a relatively short period of time and the location of the UN 
agencies in a single building in Tbilisi (the UN House) have resulted in a 
relatively high level of integration. The integration of international organisa-
tions working in Georgia has also been aided by internet technology, for 
example www.assisstancegeorgia.org.ge, which provides addresses of all 
organisations operating in Georgia, dynamic maps of their operations and a 
collection of analysis and evaluation documents. Internet publication has 
made early warning and coordination reports readily available. 
However, to some extent the relatively good coordination of the inter-
national approach to Samtskhe-Javakheti is incidental, contingent upon cer-
tain organisations taking on leading roles on their own initiative. In a policy 
paper published jointly by FEWER and International Alert, it is argued that 
‘networks are emerging as the most effective and strategic system for early 
warning, insofar as they allow for the pooling of different information sour-
ces (dynamic, local structural), methods of analysis (quantitative and qualita-
tive, local and international), and the overall sharing of the burden (resour-
ces, risk) of early warning’.48 While the roles that such NGOs and networks 
have played show how useful it is that some organisations take on leading 
roles, horizontal networks between organisations may not always be reliable 
enough for such tasks: 
 
In several cases, NGOs have been instrumental in preparing the ground… 
This strategy involves dangers too… important foreign policy initiatives are 
taken and implemented by NGOs… in some conflicts NGOs have pursued 
different, even contradictory policies… initiatives that are unco-ordinated run 
                                                     
48  Leonhardt, M. and Nyheim, D., op. cit., p. 4; cf. OECD, DAC Guidelines, op. cit., pp. 15–
16. 
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the risk of backfiring, with repercussions both for peace promotion and 
development assistance.49 
 
Central information gathering and decision-making loci are required.50 Thus 
there is a need to review previous suggestions for institutions that could 
guarantee a consistent coordinating function across regions and cases.51 This 
is not only a question of reliable administration and decision-making, but 
also one of dependable financing. Coordination is not gratis. The unpredict-
ability of   financing for coordination has been severely damaging in several 
cases, resulting in underfunding, false economies and inefficiency.52  
In terms of institutional frameworks, UNOCHA is a good start, but needs 
further development. For example, the limitation of its mandate to humani-
tarian operations limits its capacity to provide effective coordination in cases 
where humanitarian and development aid are intertwined with conflict pre-
vention in complex ways. 
A stronger and more formalised central coordinating institution with 
broader powers might also be able to more effectively include large institu-
tions such as the World Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Deve-
lopment (EBRD) and the CoE in a collaborative approach to regions such as 
Samtskhe-Javakheti. The WB and EBRD are already engaged in large infra-
structure projects elsewhere in Georgia and might easily be able to extend 
those activities to Samtskhe-Javakheti. They also have a capacity for socio-
economic analysis that many of the organisations involved in Samtskhe-
Javakheti are short of, and which is therefore often lacking in their early 
warning reports. The CoE might be induced to relate its policy on 
Meskhetian Turk repatriation to the work of other organisations in 
Samtskhe-Javakheti, perhaps taking greater account of the capacity of the 
Georgian state and society to deal with repatriation, and the danger of spark-
ing violent conflict. 
In sum, the case of Samtskhe-Javakheti shows that a relatively coordi-
nated and conscious approach to areas with both development aid and con-
flict prevention needs is possible, but that more formalised over-arching 
mechanisms and institutions are needed in order to ensure the maximisation 
and consistency of coordination, and the inclusion of all relevant actors in 
the approach of the international community to such areas. 
                                                     
49  Stokke, O., op. cit., p. 231; cf. DAC, op. cit., p. 2. 
50  For a contrary argument emphasising the need for flexibility in selecting organisations for 
leadership roles in different contexts, see OECD, DAC Guidelines, op. cit., p. 23. 
51  Cf. Stokke, O., op. cit., p. 228; OECD, DAC Guidelines, p. 28. 
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